The JUMPSEC Lab is a place where the the technical team get creative and showcase their latest security research, publications, interesting news and general thoughts! We love what we do and are passionate about security, with some great upcoming projects planned, bookmark our site and stick around to see what we are working on.
The Windows registry is a vast and complex topic and cannot be understood and defended in one article. One particular area of interest from a security perspective is registry run keys. In this article, we discuss who uses them, how to uncover abuse, and how to eradicate evil from them.
Introduction I recently researched modern algorithms used by keyfobs to open cars. Since most of the blogs online talking about the topic are unfortunately quite old and in...
Command-and-Control (C2) infrastructure is one the most important tools in a red teamer’s arsenal. In this article, we introduce a few simple methods that red teams use to harden their C2 infrastructure.
A number of web components in Endpoint Manager do not properly sanitize user input when executing SQL queries, leaving the application vulnerable to injection attacks towards the underlying database. On a standard installation with default options, the account used to query the database is database administrator.
Ivanti Unified Endpoint Manager’s “ldcient” component expose information about the system that could be used in further attacks against the system.
Improper validation on file upload functionality present in Ivanti Unified Endpoint Manager’s web management console permits an authenticated user to upload .aspx files and execute them on the MS IIS server’s context. The issue is caused by insufficient file extension validation and insecure file operations on the uploaded image, which upon failure will leave the temporarily created files in an accessible location on the server.
Several services are accessing named pipes with default or overly permissive security attributes; as these services run as user ‘NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM’, the issue can be used to escalate privileges from a local standard or service account having SeImpersonatePrivilege (eg. user ‘NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE’).
Various services running as user ‘NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM’ rely on Windows’ DLL search order for loading DLL files that are not present on the filesystem. Under certain circumstances, a local attacker would be able to place a malicious DLL file to obtain code execution in the vulnerable service’s context to elevate privileges.
The Event Log coupled with Windows Event Forwarding and Sysmon can be extremely powerful in the hands of defenders, allowing them to detect attackers every step of the way. Obviously this is an issue for the attackers. Before privilege escalation it is limited what we can do to evade event logging, but once privileges have been elevated it is an equal playing field. In the past I have released a...
Malware is an important part of an engagement, though as many security solutions are now evolving past rudimentary signature comparisons to using more advanced techniques to detect malicious activity, it is important that we as attackers understand the methods they are using and how we can avoid them. Consider the following code I wrote for example. #include <stdio.h> #include...
The project currently code-named Thunder Eye is a threat intelligence aggregator that will act as an internal and external search engine for a variety of intelligence purposes. It will collect and store data varying from vulnerability scans, DNS data, breach lists, torrent sites, honeypot networks, and some manually inserted data sourced from our threat hunting and incident response/SOC...
1e51e7b
evade current yara rule
9df61fc
added string encryption
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