Published | JUMPSEC LABS

Detecting known DLL hijacking and named pipe token impersonation attacks with Sysmon

by xnand | Nov 13, 2020 | Detection, Jumpsec, Research

Recently we posted a bunch of advisories relating to Ivanti Unified Endpoint Manager, a couple of which are for vulnerabilities which can be used to achieve local privilege escalation. We will give a brief explanation of the vulnerabilities and an example of Sysmon configuration rules to log exploitation attempts, along with the rationale behind them so you can adapt them to your existing configuration if needed.

Advisory CVE-2020-13773 – Ivanti Unified Endpoint Manager Reflected XSS

Software: Ivanti Endpoint ManagerAffected Versions: <= 2020.1.1Vendor page: www.ivanti.comCVE Reference: CVE-2020-13773Published: 13/11/2020CVSS 3.1 Score: 5.5 -...

Advisory CVE-2020-13769 – Ivanti Unified Endpoint Manager SQL injection

A number of web components in Endpoint Manager do not properly sanitize user input when executing SQL queries, leaving the application vulnerable to injection attacks towards the underlying database. On a standard installation with default options, the account used to query the database is database administrator.

Advisory CVE-2020-13772 – Ivanti Unified Endpoint Manager system information disclosure

by xnand | Nov 13, 2020 | Jumpsec, Research

Ivanti Unified Endpoint Manager’s “ldcient” component expose information about the system that could be used in further attacks against the system.

Advisory CVE-2020-13774 – Ivanti Unified Endpoint Manager authenticated RCE via file upload

by xnand | Nov 12, 2020 | Jumpsec, Research

Improper validation on file upload functionality present in Ivanti Unified Endpoint Manager’s web management console permits an authenticated user to upload .aspx files and execute them on the MS IIS server’s context. The issue is caused by insufficient file extension validation and insecure file operations on the uploaded image, which upon failure will leave the temporarily created files in an accessible location on the server.

Advisory CVE-2020-13770 – Ivanti Unified Endpoint Manager named pipe token impersonation privilege escalation

by xnand | Nov 11, 2020 | Jumpsec, Research

Several services are accessing named pipes with default or overly permissive security attributes; as these services run as user ‘NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM’, the issue can be used to escalate privileges from a local standard or service account having SeImpersonatePrivilege (eg. user ‘NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE’).

Advisory CVE-2020-13771 – Ivanti Unified Endpoint Manager DLL search order hijacking privilege escalation

by xnand | Nov 11, 2020 | Jumpsec, Research

Various services running as user ‘NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM’ rely on Windows’ DLL search order for loading DLL files that are not present on the filesystem. Under certain circumstances, a local attacker would be able to place a malicious DLL file to obtain code execution in the vulnerable service’s context to elevate privileges.

Pwning Windows Event Logging with YARA rules

by bats3c | Sep 4, 2020 | Uncategorized

The Event Log coupled with Windows Event Forwarding and Sysmon can be extremely powerful in the hands of defenders, allowing them to detect attackers every step of the way. Obviously this is an issue for the attackers. Before privilege escalation it is limited what we can do to evade event logging, but once privileges have been elevated it is an equal playing field. In the past I have released a...

Defending Your Malware

by bats3c | Aug 11, 2020 | Uncategorized

Malware is an important part of an engagement, though as many security solutions are now evolving past rudimentary signature comparisons to using more advanced techniques to detect malicious activity, it is important that we as attackers understand the methods they are using and how we can avoid them. Consider the following code I wrote for example. #include <stdio.h> #include <windows.h>...

shad0w

by bats3c | Jun 3, 2020 | Detection, Exploitation

Post exploitation is large part of a red team engagement. While many organisations begin to mature and start to deploy a range of sophisticated Endpoint Detection & Response solutions (EDR) onto their networks, it requires us, as attackers to also mature. We need to upgrade our arsenal to give us the capabilities to successfully operate on their networks. That is why today, I am releasing shad0w.

shad0w is a post exploitation framework which is designed to operate covertly on such networks, providing the operator with much greater control over their engagements. Over future blog posts I will go into greater detail on the intricacies of how shad0w works. This blog post will, therefore, serve as an introduction into the usage and features that shad0w has to offer.

A Defender’s Guide For Rootkit Detection: Episode 1 – Kernel Drivers

by rootkid8 | Apr 20, 2020 | Detection, Exploitation, Jumpsec

Recently JUMPSEC’s youngest red team researcher @_batsec_ raised the bar once more using rootkit techniques to universally evade Sysmon.

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JUMPSEC LABS

Detecting known DLL hijacking and named pipe token impersonation attacks with Sysmon

Advisory CVE-2020-13773 – Ivanti Unified Endpoint Manager Reflected XSS

Advisory CVE-2020-13769 – Ivanti Unified Endpoint Manager SQL injection

Advisory CVE-2020-13772 – Ivanti Unified Endpoint Manager system information disclosure

Advisory CVE-2020-13774 – Ivanti Unified Endpoint Manager authenticated RCE via file upload

Advisory CVE-2020-13770 – Ivanti Unified Endpoint Manager named pipe token impersonation privilege escalation

Advisory CVE-2020-13771 – Ivanti Unified Endpoint Manager DLL search order hijacking privilege escalation

Pwning Windows Event Logging with YARA rules

Defending Your Malware

shad0w

A Defender’s Guide For Rootkit Detection: Episode 1 – Kernel Drivers

[[email protected]]-[echo $PWD]

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