Detection Archives | JUMPSEC LABS

Weaponize Your Word – Malicious Template Injection

by Max Clarke | Oct 30, 2024 | Detection, Initial Access, Red Teaming, Research, Windows

Weaponize Your Word - Malicious Template Injection Historically, files sent via email have been a common initial access technique employed by threat actors. Personally, I have seen emails containing malware prove effective, and in the case of an IR (Incident Response) involving a malware infection, it would be one of the first places I would look to identify the source of compromise. There are many techniques for bypassing an email solution to deploy malware on an endpoint, however an old...

Active Cyber Defence – Taking back control

by Umair Qamar | Oct 15, 2024 | Detection, Incident Response

Every good cybersecurity article needs a Sun Tzu quote, here is one lesser known quote from Sun Tzu to start us off. What Happened? Recently, JUMPSEC’s Detection and Response Team (DART) caught a Red Team inside one of our MxDR clients' networks using a honeypot server. The honeypot server was set up using Thinkst Applied Research’s project called OpenCanary. This open-source project from Thinkst emulates different network protocols and when interacted with, creates an alert providing...

Hunting for ‘Snake’

by Francesco Iulio | May 26, 2023 | Detection, Jumpsec

Following the NCSC and CISA’s detailed joint advisory on the highly sophisticated ‘Snake’ cyber espionage tool, JUMPSEC threat intelligence analysts have provided a condensed blueprint for organisations to start proactively hunting for Snake within their network, contextualising key Indicators of Compromise (IoC), and providing additional methods to validate the effectiveness of Snake detections. Snake’s capabilities The implant dubbed ‘Snake’ has been attributed to Centre 16 of Russia’s state...

Implementation and Dynamic Generation for Tasks in Apache Airflow

by Newt Tan | Nov 23, 2022 | Detection, Research

I recently worked on a project focused on log anomaly detection using manageable machine learning pipelines. The pipelines mainly include data collection --- feature extraction --- feature engineering --- detection/prediction --- updating (maintenance). It’s important to have a solid UI to manage the pipelines so I can easily review the chain of pipelines. After much research, I found many engineers recommended Airflow. In airflow, the core concept is the Directed Acyclic Graph...

PowerShell Jobs

by editor | Oct 7, 2021 | Detection, Incident Response, Monitoring, Windows

JUMPSEC investigators recently observed an adversary weaponising PowerShell Jobs to schedule their attack whilst responding to an incident. We discuss what PowerShell Jobs are, how they can be leveraged for malicious purposes, and how defenders can protect, detect, and respond to neutralise the threat.

Running Once, Running Twice, Pwned! Windows Registry Run Keys

by editor | Aug 11, 2021 | Detection, Incident Response, Monitoring, Windows

The Windows registry is a vast and complex topic and cannot be understood and defended in one article. One particular area of interest from a security perspective is registry run keys. In this article, we discuss who uses them, how to uncover abuse, and how to eradicate evil from them.

PRINTNIGHTMARE NETWORK ANALYSIS

by editor | Jul 7, 2021 | Detection, Uncategorized

By Dray Agha The infosec community has been busy dissecting the PrintNightmare exploit. There are now variations of the exploit that can have various impacts on a target machine. When we at JUMPSEC saw that Lares had captured some network traffic of the PrintNightmare exploit in action, I wondered if there was an opportunity to gather network-level IoCs and processes that could offer defenders unique but consistent methods of detection across...

Securing against new offensive techniques abusing active directory certificate service

by editor | Jul 6, 2021 | Detection, Vulnerability

SpecterOps recently released an offensive security research paper that details techniques enabling an adversary to abuse insecure functionality in Active Directory Certificate Service. SpecterOps reports that abusing the legitimate functionality of Active Directory Certificate Service will allow an adversary to forge the elements of a certificate to authenticate as any user or administrator in Active Directory. JUMPSEC has highlighted numerous changes that can be made to Active Directory...

JUMPSEC LABS

Weaponize Your Word – Malicious Template Injection

Active Cyber Defence – Taking back control

Hunting for ‘Snake’

Implementation and Dynamic Generation for Tasks in Apache Airflow

PowerShell Jobs

Running Once, Running Twice, Pwned! Windows Registry Run Keys

PRINTNIGHTMARE NETWORK ANALYSIS

Securing against new offensive techniques abusing active directory certificate service

[Latest Posts]

[Categories]

GitHub

Follow JumpsecLabs

Disclaimer